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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
KARSENTY V. SCHOUKROUN: AN INTER VIVOS TRANSFER 
OF PROPERTY, WHERE THE DECEDENT RETAINED 
CONTROL DURING HIS LIFETIME, IS NOT PER SE 
VIOLATIVE OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO A SHARE OF THE ESTATE. 
By: Erin Day 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an inter vivos transfer 
may not be invalidated, for the purpose of determining a spouse's 
elective share, based solely on the fact that the decedent retained 
control of the property during his lifetime. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 
406 Md. 469, 959 A.2d 1147 (2008). Even where such transfers 
derogate a surviving spouse's statutory right to the decedent's net 
estate, the transfer is not per se fraud. !d. at 490, 959 A.2d 1159. 
Gilles H. Schoukroun ("Gilles") died in October 2004. His estate 
planning arrangements were carried out in accordance with his will 
and a revocable trust. Gilles' will bequested his tangible personal 
property to his wife of four years, Kathleen Sexton ("Kathleen"). She 
was also the beneficiary of Gilles' life insurance proceeds totaling 
$200,000. Gilles had a contractual obligation to maintain a life 
insurance policy naming his daughter from a previous marriage, 
Lauren, as the beneficiary but, Gilles failed to do so. Instead, Gilles 
named Lauren, as the beneficiary of the trust. He appointed himself as 
the trustee and Maryse Karsenty ("Maryse"), his sister, as the trustee 
upon his death, with Kathleen as the alternative trustee in the event 
that Maryse could not serve. The trust, valued at about $422,000, 
included three financial accounts and two IRA transfer-on-death 
accounts. 
In February 2005 Kathleen renounced Gilles' will and filed for a 
statutory share of the estate. Kathleen filed a complaint in the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County, claiming that the trust constituted 
fraud in violation of her statutory right as the surviving spouse. The 
circuit court determined that the trust did not constitute fraud. Both 
parties appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed 
the trial court's disposition as to Kathleen's fraud claim. The Court of 
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Appeals of Maryland granted Maryse's petition and Kathleen's 
conditional cross-petition for writs of certiorari. 
The court first analyzed Maryland's elective share statute which 
provides surviving spouses with the option of either taking the 
property left to them pursuant to the decedent's will, or taking a one-
third share of the decedent's "net estate." Karsenty, 406 Md. at 487, 
959 A.2d at 1157 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 
(West 2008)). Looking at the "unambiguous" language of Section 3-
203 of the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code ("Section 
3-203"), the court determined that "net estate" includes only property 
to which the decedent retained an interest following his death. 
Karsenty, 406 Md. at 488, 959 A.2d at 1158 (citing 1 PAGE OF THE 
LAW OF WILLS§ 16.10(2003)). The court concluded that the trust 
did not fall within the definition of "net estate" because Gilles' interest 
in the trust terminated at his death. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 488, 959 
A.2d at 1158. Therefore, in accordance with Section 3-203, Kathleen 
was not entitled to a statutory share of the trust. /d. at 489, 959 A.2d 
at 1158. 
Kathleen maintained that the value of the trust should be included 
as part of Gilles' net estate because the transfer to Lauren was invalid. 
/d. at 489, 959 A.2d at 1158-59. Kathleen argued that a per se rule 
had been established in Maryland, requiring that inter vivos transfers 
be pulled into the decedent's net estate when the decedent retained 
control of the property. /d. at 491, 959 A.2d at 1159 (citing Knell v. 
Price, 318 Md. 501, 569 A.2d 636 (1990)). The court decided that a 
decedent's control over property during life did not, in and of itself, 
constitute per se fraud. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 491, 959 A.2d at 1159-
60. The decision to set aside such agreements should be done on a 
case-by-case basis, after considering all surrounding facts and 
circumstances. /d. at 491, 959 A.2d at 1160. 
The court next analyzed the facts and circumstances to be 
considered in determining the validity of such transfers. /d. at 502, 
959 A.2d at 1166. Historically, inter vivos transfers were invalidated 
when the court determined that the transfer was a "mere device or 
contrivance." /d. at 507, 959 A.2d at 1169 (citing Hays v. Henry, 1 
Md. Chan. 337 (1851)). While that precise language has been 
abandoned, the standard remains the same. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 509, 
959 A.2d at 1170. In a case involving a revocable deed of trust, the 
court refused to invalidate the trust as violative of spousal rights based 
on the determination that the transfer was "complete and bona fide." 
/d. at 509, 959 A.2d at 1170 (citing Brown v. Fid. Trust Co., 126 Md. 
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175, 94 A. 523 (1915)). Here, although Gilles retained control over 
the trust during his life, a decedent's retained control alone does not 
discern a genuine inter vivos transfer from a fraud. Karsenty, 406 Md. 
at 501, 959 A.2d at 1165-66. 
Admitting the difficulty in distinguishing a bona fide transfer from 
a "sham," the court listed three considerations to assist in the analysis. 
/d. at 514, 959 A.2d at 1173. First, is whether the decedent retained an 
interest in, or continued to enjoy, the transferred property. /d. 
Although such control does not, by itself, invalidate the transfer, it 
raises the question of good faith. Id. at 515, 959 A.2d at 1173 (citing 
Mushaw v. Mushaw, 188 Md. 511, 519, 39 A.2d 465, 468 (1944)). 
Second, judicial discretion should not be used to undo estate planning 
arrangements which are valid and legitimate. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 
515, 959 A.2d at 1174. Third, the validity and legitimacy of such 
arrangements should be assessed after considering a number of 
relevant factors. /d. at 516, 959 A.2d at 117 4. 
The court analyzed several factors, but noted that the list 
expounded is not exhaustive. /d. at 525, 959 A.2d at 1180. First, is 
the extent of control retained by the decedent. /d. at 516, 959 A.2d at 
1174. The court noted that in every case involving an invalidated inter 
vivos transfer, the decedent retained a "significant" amount of control. 
/d. The court should also consider whether the decedent actually 
exercised that retained control. /d. at 522, 959 A.2d at 1178. 
Excessive control or enjoyment of the property suggests that the 
decedent did not truly intend to part with ownership. /d. Here, the 
circuit court indicated that while Gilles retained control over the trust, 
he did not exercise that control or interfere with the trust. /d. at 523, 
959 A.2d at 1179. 
Furthermore, the motives of the decedent and the beneficiary of the 
inter vivos transfer should be considered. /d. at 517-19, 959 A.2d at 
1175-76. The decedent's motives may indicate that the transfer 
"actually was intended to be complete and bona fide." /d. at 518, 959 
A.2d at 1175. Also, in addition to possible collusion, future courts 
should consider whether the beneficiary's motives were to defraud the 
decedent or the surviving spouse. /d. at 519, 959 A.2d at 1176. 
Another factor is the degree to which the surviving spouse is 
deprived of property that otherwise would have been included in the 
decedent's net estate. /d. at 20, 959 A.2d at 1176. The inter vivos 
transfer is more likely to be valid when the decedent leaves reasonable 
provisions for the surviving spouse. /d. at 520, 959 A.2d at 1177. 
Here, the circuit court determined that Gilles did not intend to defraud 
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Kathleen, rather, he intended to provide for both Lauren and Kathleen. 
ld. at 519, 959 A.2d at 1176. The court noted that although Lauren 
benefited more, Kathleen was by no means left destitute. Jd. at 522, 
959 A.2d at 1178. 
A final factor is the familial relationship between the decedent and 
the beneficiary of the inter vivos transfer. Id. at 524, 959 A.2d at 
1179. A transfer is more likely valid if made to support children from 
a previous marriage, especially when the surviving spouse and 
decedent were only recently married. ld. Not only did Gilles have a 
pre-existing obligation to provide for Lauren, but Gilles and Kathleen 
were only married a short time. Id. at 525, 959 A.2d at 1179. 
Karsenty established the current standard for determining the 
validity of an inter vivos transfer that affects the statutory entitlements 
of a surviving spouse. An inter vivos transfer will not be set aside 
based solely on the decedents retained control of the transferred 
property, and careful planning can ensure the validity of such 
transfers. For example, the decedent should not exercise excessive 
control over the property during his lifetime. Additionally, the transfer 
will seem more bona fide where there is a legitimate purpose behind 
the transfer, as well as reasonable, alternative provisions for the 
surviving spouse. Maryland estate planners should be aware of this 
decision and the specific facts and circumstances that tend to illustrate 
a legitimate and bona fide inter vivos transfer of property. 
